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INTRODUCTION
The recent New Jersey Supreme Court case, Battaglia v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.,1 effectively broadened protection against retaliation
afforded to employees under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination
(“LAD”).2 This judiciary action is consistent with a predictable national
trend, stemming from recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting
employer retaliation liability based upon the “purpose” of the statute
rather than the explicit language contained in the statute.3 The Supreme
Court’s interpretation increases the protection afforded to employees by
eliminating potential loopholes for employer liability that result from a
more textualist reading. This new standard, however, also increases the
risk of frivolous claims resulting in harm to judicial economy and creates
issues of horizontal equity due to the malleability of a standard
formulated based upon the purpose and spirit of a statute rather than its
language.
In order to address these problems while effectively protecting the
rights of employees, the New Jersey Supreme Court needs to clarify the
good faith reasonable belief standard articulated in Battaglia. The
Battaglia court held that as long as an employee can demonstrate a goodfaith belief that the alleged conduct violated the LAD or that the conduct
was simply inconsistent with the objectives of the LAD, he or she is not
required to show actual discrimination against an identifiable victim.4
This Note examines the good faith reasonable standard’s evolution and
application in federal courts, as well as its recent articulation in New
Jersey state courts. While this Note approves of the protection afforded
by such a standard in retaliation cases, it proposes a clarification of its
application for New Jersey courts.
Part II discusses the LAD and the recent trend of rising retaliation
claims across the nation. Part III analyzes Supreme Court cases
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and other federal anti-retaliation statutes based on the
purpose of the statutes, rather than the text. Further, Part III discusses
cases in which the Court took a different approach in interpreting
retaliation statutes. Part IV highlights the decisions of lower courts which
have applied the Supreme Court’s anti-retaliation standard differently
1
2
3
4

214 N.J. 518 (2013).
Id.
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1997).
Battaglia, 214 N.J. 518.
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than the New Jersey Supreme Court in Battaglia. Part V analyzes the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Battaglia. Part VI explores the
potential interpretations and consequences of the Battaglia holding.
Finally, Part VII concludes that while the holding in Battaglia,
specifically the reasoning behind the holding, is consistent with the
reasoning behind recent United States Supreme Court anti-retaliation
cases, the actual implications of the decision remain unclear and will pose
problems in application for lower courts in New Jersey.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAD AND RECENT TRENDS IN RETALIATION
CLAIMS
A. New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination
New Jersey has one of the most comprehensive antidiscrimination
statutes in the nation.5 The LAD predates the state’s constitution and was
originally enacted in April of 1945.6 The statute was enacted in
recognition of the state’s public policy against discrimination with an
objective explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court as, “nothing less
than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination.”7 To maximize its
intended protection of victims of discrimination, the LAD explicitly
provides that it be construed liberally.8 New Jersey courts have
acknowledged that the purpose of the LAD is to protect not only
employees, but also the general public’s interest in eradicating
discrimination.9
As amended over the years, the LAD prohibits employment
discrimination against any person based on race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, sex, gender identity or expression, affection or
sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service in
the Armed Forces, disability or nationality.10 The LAD also makes it
5

1945 N.J. Laws 169 (as amended N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1–42 (West 1945)).
Id.
7 Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600 (1993); Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d
652, 660 (N.J. 1988).
8 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 2007) (stating that “[the harms of discrimination]
have, under the common law, given rise to legal remedies, including compensatory and
punitive damages. The Legislature intends that such damages be available to all persons
protected by the Act and this Act shall be liberally construed in combination with other
protection available under the laws of this state”).
9 Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 750 A.2d 73, 75 (N.J. 2000) (“The purpose of both
the LAD and CEPA is deterrence of improper employer conduct to protect society from the
vestiges of discrimination.”).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1.
6
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illegal “[f]or any person to take reprisals against any person because that
person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act[.]”11
New Jersey courts have interpreted the LAD to require three
elements for a retaliation claim: (1) the employee “engaged in a protected
activity known to the [employer,]” (2) the employee was “subjected to an
adverse employment decision,” and (3) there was a causal link between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.12 Additionally,
to be protected, a plaintiff’s opposition to alleged discrimination must be
both reasonable and made in good faith.13
New Jersey courts often look to federal precedent when interpreting
Title VII “as a key source of interpretive authority” in construing the
terms of the LAD, but, as we will see, state courts are sometimes more
protective of plaintiffs than federal courts.14
B. Title VII and the Nationwide Rise in Retaliation Claims
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), makes it an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against an employee because (1) he has opposed any practice
made unlawful by this subchapter, or (2) he made a charge, assisted,
testified, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.15 The Supreme Court has described the “purpose” of the
anti-retaliation provision as, “seek[ing] to secure [the] primary objective
[of ending workplace discrimination] by preventing an employer from
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”16
According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), retaliation claims became the most common charges filed
with the EEOC as of 2009.17 The total number of charges filed decreased
11

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (West 2014), see Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723
A.2d 944, 958 (N.J. 1999) (discussing LAD); Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
650 A.2d 958, 971 (N.J. 1994).
12 Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 675 A.2d 684, 695 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
13 Carmona v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 915 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J. 2007).
14 Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 452 (1993); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 906 (N.J. 1990).
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); David Long-Daniels
& Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation Claims, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L.
437 (2013).
16 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
17 EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
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by over 500 from 2010 to 2012; however, during that same time period,
retaliation charges increased by over 1,500.18 This increase is consistent
with a trend over the last decade in which the number of retaliation
charges has more than doubled.19 Beyond the statistical increase in claims
filed, the EEOC itself has seemingly increased its focus on retaliation
claims.20 As the September 4, 2012 version of the EEOC’s Strategic
Enforcement Plan makes clear, “the EEOC views retaliation as a direct
affront to its law enforcement obligations and an intolerable denial of
access to courts for victims of discrimination.”21 The EEOC targets
policies and practices that discourage individuals from exercising rights
granted under employment discrimination statutes, including retaliatory
actions.22 The increase in retaliation claims does not demonstrate any
signs of slowing in the near future, and, on both a federal and New Jersey
state level, the law has recently shifted to favor plaintiffs who assert
retaliation claims.23
Retaliation claims pose a major difficulty for employers.24 If the
employer allows the retaliation claim to proceed to trial, jurors are more
likely to believe and sympathize with a plaintiff employee than with a
plaintiff claiming status-based discrimination because an average juror
has likely experienced some form of retaliation in his or her lifetime.25
This is in part because New Jersey mandates that prospective jurors be
excused from service if it will create a financial hardship.26 Generally
speaking, trials involving claims based on the LAD consume more time
than routine motor vehicle accident cases and trip-and-fall cases.27 As a
18

Id.
EEOC, Retaliation-Based Charges FY 1997-FY 2013,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm (last visited Sept. 18,
2014).
20 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 438.
21 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 438.
22 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 438–39.
23 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 448. But cf. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff must prove retaliation causation using
“but for” causation, not a lessened standard).
24 Stuart W. Davidson & Scott M. Pollins, Determining Employment Discrimination Case
Merits Under State and Federal Law, ASPATORE, *1, *6 (2012), available at 2012 WL
3058210.
25 Id.
26 State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 138 (N.J. 1987); Telephone Interview with Judge
James P. Savio, J.S.C., Judge in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Atlantic County (Sept. 24, 2013) (hereinafter “Judge Savio”).
27 Judge Savio, supra note 26.
19
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result, the issue of juror bias is exacerbated because self-employed
individuals, who would probably be more sympathetic to the position of
an employer, are generally excused from jury service.28 For the selfemployed, jury service is a financial hardship as compared to employees
who are typically paid their normal salaries by their employers while
serving; thus, those employees do not experience any financial hardship.
Moreover, because of the fee-shifting provisions under the LAD, the
employer in a best-case scenario is responsible for the payment of its own
attorney’s fees, but in the event the plaintiff is successful, the employer
is also responsible for the counsel fees of the plaintiff.29 Therefore, the
longer the litigation process, the greater the financial burden on the
employer for counsel fees.30 As we will see, the Supreme Court’s
repeated expansion of employee protection poses a significant challenge
to employers and increases the likelihood a jury will hear a given claim.31
III. SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RETALIATION
CLAIMS
The Supreme Court has justified recently broadening the scope of
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII in terms of the “purpose” of the
statute rather than the text, noting that the provision, “seeks to secure [the]
primary objective [of ending workplace discrimination] by preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”32
A discussion of several decisions illuminates the scope of the Supreme
Courts’ broadening, as well as the justification and purpose of the
generous interpretation.
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing Title VII’s antiretaliation provision was Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,33 which set the stage
for a purposive approach to anti-retaliation provisions. In Robinson, the
Court held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covered current
employees, job applicants and former employees—although read
literally, its language does not reach former employees.34 The plaintiff in
28

Judge Savio, supra note 26.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27.1 (West 2002).
30 Judge Savio, supra note 26.
31 Judge Savio, supra note 26.
32 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). But see Univ. of
Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532–33 (2013).
33 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
34 Id. at 345–46.
29
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Robinson was fired and subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC
alleging race-based discrimination.35 While the complaint was pending,
the plaintiff applied for another job and received a negative job reference
from his previous employer, which he believed was retaliation for his
EEOC complaint.36
The language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision grants
protection to “employees” and “applicants for employment;”
nevertheless, the Robinson Court concluded that this language was
ambiguous and that former employees were also protected.37 In
explaining the holding, the Court began the trend of relying on the
“purpose” of the anti-retaliation provision to broaden its scope.38 The
Court noted that a narrow interpretation of the term “employee” would
contradict the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision, which is to
maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”39
In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,40 the Supreme Court
addressed the relationship between discrimination and retaliation. In
Jackson, a high-school girls basketball coach supported his team’s Title
IX right to equal treatment and consequently lost his coaching position.41
Title IX explicitly prohibits discrimination based upon sex, but contains
no explicit language addressing retaliation.42 The Supreme Court
nevertheless held that Congress’ failure to include a retaliation provision
was not dispositive.43 More importantly, the Court held that retaliation
for complaining about sex discrimination was a form of sex
discrimination in and of itself.44 It noted that the efficacy of the statute
would be called into question if the protection did not extend beyond
victims of discrimination to complainants like Coach Jackson.45
The United States Supreme Court next increased employee
protection in the Title VII retaliation context with its 2006 decision in
35

Id. at 339.
Id.
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012); Id. at 345–46.
38 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345–46.
39 Id. at 346.
40 544 U.S. 176 (2005); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J.
115, 121 (2014).
41 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172.
42 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 2014).
43 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174–75.
44 Id. at 173–75, 178.
45 Brake, supra note 40, at 121.
36
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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White46 by broadly
defining actions constituting retaliation. In that case, plaintiff Sheila
White argued that she was retaliated against by being (1) reassigned to a
dirtier, more difficult and less desirable job and, (2) suspended without
pay for thirty-seven days, although she was eventually reinstated with
back pay.47 The Supreme Court expanded the reach of retaliation
protection in two ways. First, the Court held that retaliation claims are
not limited to workplace conduct, a somewhat surprising holding since
the retaliatory actions taken against Sheila White were directly related to
both her employment and workplace conduct.48 Therefore, the case, did
not require the Supreme Court to broaden the reach of retaliation claims
to include out of work conduct. The Court nonetheless chose to broaden
the definition of retaliation to include actions not directly related to
employment and harm outside of the workplace, opening up employers
to liability in a much broader set of circumstances.
Second, the Court rejected any requirement that retaliation is
actionable only if it constitutes an “ultimate” employment action.49
Instead, the Court determined that a plaintiff must show only “that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”‘50 While the “materially adverse” standard does not
permit suit for “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good
manners,” it does recognize a wide variety of workplace harms as
retaliatory.51 This test, while still requiring the employer to exhibit
retaliatory intent, significantly changes the main focus of the retaliation
analysis from the employer’s actual conduct, to what the reasonable
employee believes about the employer’s action.52
The Burlington Northern Court analyzed the reasonable employee
46

548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Id. at 57, 59.
48 Id. at 63 (“An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions
not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”).
49 Id. at 67 (“The scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond the workplacerelated or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”).
50 Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); Michael
J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917,
920 (2009).
51 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68–69 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 2006)); see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 920–21.
52 See Davidson, supra note 24, at 5.
47
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standard when applying it to the facts of this case.53 By using the phrase
“reasonable employee,” the Court intended the standard for judging harm
to be objective; however, this objective standard has a subjective
component and therefore must be judged “from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.”54 The Court further
clarified, the “significance of any given act of retaliation will often
depend upon the particular circumstances.”55 In other words, “[c]ontext
matters.”56 Applying these freshly-coined concepts to the facts of
Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court concluded that White’s
reassignment may have been materially adverse to a reasonable
employee.57 Further, the Supreme Court held that White’s suspension
could act as a deterrent to a reasonable employee, even though White
eventually received back pay in full.58
Two years later, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,59 a plaintiff sued
his former employer alleging race discrimination and retaliation in
violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), a post-Civil War
Reconstruction Era statute prohibiting discrimination based upon race in
the creation and enforcement of contracts.60 The plaintiff, an African
American employee, claimed that his employer discriminated against him
because he complained about the discriminatory actions of his supervisor
towards another African American employee.61 Section 1981 provides,
“[a]ll persons living within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts
. . . as enjoyed by white citizens.”62 The Court concluded that Section
1981, while not explicitly addressing retaliation, does in fact protect
employees who complain about race discrimination against retaliation.63
The Court, however, did not explain the scope of this protection.64 The
53

Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 71.
Id.; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 920–21.
55 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68–69; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 920–21.
56 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 921.
57 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 70–72.
58 Id. at 70, 72–73.
59 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
60 Id. at 445.
61 Id.
62 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); see Zimmer, supra note 50,
at 922.
63 See CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 448–57 (limiting discussion of § 1981's scope to
the effect of post-contract-formation conduct); see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 922.
64 CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 448–57; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 922.
54
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Court found that plaintiff, as a third party who did not personally
experience discrimination, had a cognizable claim.65 Carrying the opinion
to its logical conclusions, the statute must at least protect employees from
retaliation for having complained about race discrimination against
another person and not just against the employee him or herself.66
In 2008, the Supreme Court addressed retaliation in the context of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to federal sector
workers—the relevant language prohibits discrimination based upon age
without explicitly mentioning retaliation.67 In Gomez-Perez, the Court
held that the prohibition includes protection from retaliation, relying on
the broad ban on discrimination and the general language of the provision
itself.68
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed Title VII retaliation in
Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P.69 Here, Thompson’s fiancée
filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC.70 Three weeks after the
charge was filed, Thompson was fired.71 The Supreme Court utilized a
two-step analysis for Thompson’s retaliation claim: (1) whether
Thompson’s termination constituted retaliation under Title VII and, if so,
(2) whether such termination gave Thompson (as opposed to his fiancée)
a retaliation claim.72 In a unanimous 8–0 decision, the Court held that it
was “obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging
in protected activity if she knew that her fiancé would be fired.”73
Consequently, the Court held that Thompson’s fiancée did have a viable
claim for retaliation based on Thompson’s termination.74 However, the
Court cautioned that not every act of retaliation against a third party
would meet the Burlington Northern standard.75
65

CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 452; see Zimmer, supra note 49, at 922.
CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 452; see Zimmer, supra note 49, at 922.
67 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2006); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008).
68 Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 468–88.
69 131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2011) (recusing herself, Justice Kagan took no part in the
consideration of this case).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.; Jessica Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s Incomplete
Approach to Defining the Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
521, 527 n. 123 (2011).
74 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
75 Id. at 868 (“We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the
Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never
66
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Next, the Court examined whether Thompson could bring a
retaliation claim.76 The Court noted that Title VII actions are limited to
those brought “by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”77 The Court then
adopted the “zone of interests” test used in the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides that a plaintiff “may not sue unless he falls within
the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision
whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.”78 In terms of
Title VII, the “zone of interests” test means that any employee with an
interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statutes” may sue.79 The
Supreme Court held that Title VII intended to protect individuals, such
as Thompson, harmed by the intentional and unlawful conduct of an
employer.80 Once again, the Court broadened the scope of Title VII, by
relying not on the statutory language itself but, rather upon the “purpose”
or “intent” of the statute.81
The Thompson holding dispensed any requirement that the plaintiff
must engage in a statutorily protected activity.82 In terms of the statutory
text, Thompson did not qualify under either the “opposition clause” or
the “participation clause.”83 Analyzing the importance of the Thompson
decision, David Long-Daniels noted, “[i]n the end, the lesson of
Thompson is that third-party retaliation creates two distinct claims for
retaliation: one claim by the individual who engaged in the protected
activity and a separate claim by the individual who suffered the brunt of
the retaliation.”84
Although the trend seems to be broadening employers’ liability
under Title VII and other federal discrimination retaliation statutes based
upon the purpose or spirit of the statutes, the Court has taken a different
approach in several cases. In Clark County School District v. Breeden,85
a female plaintiff met with her male supervisor and another male
do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize.”).
76 Id. at 870.
77 Id. at 869 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006)).
78 Id. at 870 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006)) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)).
79 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank
& Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998)).
80 Id.; Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442.
81 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870; Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442.
82 Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442.
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(3)(a) (2014).
84 Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442.
85 532 U.S. 268, 269 (2001).
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employee to review psychological evaluation reports of job applicants.86
One of the reports disclosed that an applicant had once commented to a
co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand
Canyon.”87 The supervisor stated that he did not know what the statement
meant and the other employee present replied, “Well, I’ll tell you later,”
and both men laughed.88 Subsequently, the plaintiff complained about the
comment to both the employee and the employee’s supervisor and alleged
that she was retaliated against for these complaints.89
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII
protected employee opposition not only to actually unlawful practices,
but also to practices that the employee could reasonably believe were
unlawful.90 The Supreme Court declined to address the propriety of this
interpretation, positing, “even assuming it is correct, no one could
reasonably believe that the incident recounted about violated Title VII.”91
In analyzing the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, the Court noted,
“‘[a] recurring point in [our] opinion[s] is that simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of
employment.’”92 Accordingly, it would not be reasonable to believe such
a comment was a violation, even if it reflected sex bias. The Breeden
Court did not evaluate possible alternatives to the “reasonableness”
requirement, offer any evaluation of the standard, or even justify its use
by examining its effect on the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision.93
The Court most recently addressed the topic of Title VII retaliation
claims in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.94
There, the plaintiff, Dr. Nassar, was a physician of Middle-Eastern
descent who claimed that one of his supervisors, Dr. Levine, was biased
against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage.95 Dr. Nassar,
a University of Texas faculty member, was offered a position at Parkland
86

Id.
Id. (quoting Brief in Opposition 3).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 269–70.
90 Id. at 270.
91 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 270.
92 Id. at 271 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
93 Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting "Reasonableness": A New Look at Title VII's AntiRetaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2007).
94 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2517 (2013).
95 Id. at 2520.
87
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Memorial Hospital.96 Subsequently, he resigned from his teaching
position at the University of Texas and sent a letter to his supervisor, Dr.
Fitz, and others stating that he was leaving as a result of Dr. Levine’s
harassment.97 Upon receiving the letter, Dr. Fitz expressed concern that
Dr. Levine had been humiliated and protested to the Hospital, which
subsequently withdrew its job offer to the plaintiff.98 The Court drew a
sharp distinction between retaliation claims related to the withdrawal of
employment offers, and to status-based discrimination claims (the
original harassment claim on the basis of national origin or religion).
Here, Dr. Nassar’s status-based discrimination claim was against Dr.
Levine, while his retaliation claim was against Dr. Fitz.99
Prior to Nassar, the Court required proof of “motivating factor”
causation for claims of status-based discrimination.100 Under that
standard, a plaintiff is only required to present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude “race, color, religion, sex or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”101 Justice
Kennedy, for the majority in Nassar, sought to define the proper standard
of causation for Title VII retaliation claims.102 The Court discussed the
rising number of Title VII retaliation claims in recent years and noted that
a lessened standard of causation for retaliation claims would only
contribute to the filing of frivolous claims and, “siphon resources from
efforts by employer[s], administrative agencies, and courts to combat
workplace harassment.”103 The Court continued, “[i]t would be
inconsistent with the structure and operation of Title VII to so raise the
costs, both financial and reputational, on an employer whose actions were
not in fact the result of any discriminatory or retaliatory intent.”104 Justice
Kennedy accordingly concluded that a plaintiff must prove retaliation in
terms of “but-for” causation, not a lessened standard.105
This recent decision, while consistent with Breeden, may show a
96

Id.
Id.
98 Id. at 2524.
99 Id. at 2532.
100 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–101 (2003).
101 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 2538 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(m)
(2006)).
102 Id. at 2524.
103 Id. at 2531–32; 29 NO. 8 TERM. OF EMPLOYMENT BULL. NL 1 (2013).
104 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
105 Id. at 2533.
97
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trend of the Supreme Court backing away from its broadened definition
of retaliation under Title VII set out in Burlington Northern.106 Through
the heightened standard of causation, the Court now seems to be
attempting to reduce the number of claims by making it more difficult to
prove retaliation.107
IV. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE GOOD FAITH
REASONABLE BELIEF STANDARD
A discussion of lower court applications of the good faith reasonable
belief standard articulated by the Supreme Court illuminates the
similarities between that standard and the one the New Jersey Supreme
Court articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Battaglia. The
varying applications of this standard highlight its malleability, due to its
reliance on the broad purposes of a remedial statute rather than statutory
language itself, and the problems it presents in terms of horizontal equity
and judicial economy.
In Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division,108 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a white employee
who opposed the racially derogatory comment of a co-worker had a valid
retaliation claim under Title VII.109 Circuit Judge Birch held, as a matter
of first impression, that the white employee reacting to the racially
offensive comment of the co-worker alone did not constitute statutorilyprotected activity so as to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII.110 Plaintiff Bryan Little was a white male who worked with
Willie Wilmot, also a white male employee.111 According to Little,
Wilmot approached him and stated, “[n]obody runs this team but a bunch
of niggers and I’m going to get rid of them.”112 Evidently, Little informed
several co-workers about the statement and communicated the slur at a
team meeting; as a result Little’s supervisor issued a “Record of
Conversation” noting the occurrence.113 Little contended that he was
harassed continuously from that point forward in retaliation for having

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006).
29 NO. 8 TERM. OF EMPLOYMENT BULL. NL 1 (2013).
103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
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complained about Wilmot’s conduct.114
The Eleventh Circuit held that Little failed to show that he was
engaged in a statutorily-protected activity.115 Judge Birch acknowledged
that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title
VII, “if he shows that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.”116 The court
further explained that a plaintiff must, “not only show that he subjectively
(that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively
reasonable,” although a plaintiff need not prove the underlying conduct
was actually unlawful.117 Applying this standard, the court found Little’s
assertion that he reasonably believed the comment to be a violation of
Title VII to be implausible at best.118 Little did not have an objectively
reasonable belief that he opposed an unlawful employment practice and,
therefore, failed to set forth a prima facie case under Title VII.119 This
decision highlights the malleability of the “reasonable employee”
standard, which in the application of the Eleventh Circuit more closely
resembles a requirement of correctness in terms of the unlawfulness of
the underlying conduct, rather than a context-based, employee-friendly
analysis. Although the term used was racist and Little believed that it
was unlawful, it was only spoken by a co-worker and was not severe or
pervasive enough to contaminate the work environment.120 These
requirements, however, are nuances of the law and seemingly have little
to do with the reasonableness of Little’s belief.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the standard in Silver v. KCA, Inc.,121
where the plaintiff objected to a racially derogatory remark uttered by a
co-worker and was subsequently fired.122 In finding that the plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the
Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s opposition to a co-worker’s own
individual act of discrimination, “does not fall within the protection of

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 958 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 959.
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Little, 103 F.3d at 960.
586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 140.
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[Title VII].”123 The court reasoned that, “[b]y the terms of the statute . . .
not every act by an employee in opposition to racial discrimination is
protected. The opposition must be directed at an unlawful employment
practice of an employer, not an act of discrimination by a private
individual.”124 However, Silver was decided in 1978, and the Ninth
Circuit has since clarified that a plaintiff “must only show that she had a
‘reasonable belief’ that the employment practice she protested was
prohibited under Title VII” in order to establish that she was engaged in
protected activity.125 Therefore, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit are not
required to show that the employment practice they are protesting
actually violates Title VII.126 The reasoning of the court in this case is
illustrative of how a court applies an anti-retaliation statute if plaintiffs
were required to be correct about the unlawfulness of the underlying
conduct.
In Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.,127 the Eleventh
Circuit held that a grooming policy allowing female employees to have
long hair, but not permitting male employees to do so, was not actionable
under Title VII.128 Several male employees of Blockbuster alleged that
the grooming policy of the employer discriminated against them based
on sex, and that they were discharged in retaliation for protesting that
policy.129 The grooming policy prohibited men, but not women, from
wearing their hair long.130 The plaintiffs protested the policy by refusing
to cut their hair and were subsequently terminated.131 In analyzing the
plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court noted that, while the conduct which
the employee protests is not required to be actually unlawful, a plaintiff
is still required to demonstrate that he or she had “a good faith, reasonable
belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment
practices.”132 Notably, the court explained, “the allegations and record
must also indicate that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was
123

Id. at 142.
Id. at 141.
125 Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994); McZeal v. City of
Seattle, No. C05-1965P, 2006 WL 3254504, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2006).
126 Trent, 41 F.3d at 526.
127 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998).
128 Id. at 1387.
129 Id. at 1385.
130 Id. at 1386.
131 Id. at 1386−87.
132 Id. at 1388 (quoting Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997)).
124
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objectively reasonable.”133
Holding that the plaintiffs’ belief that the grooming policy was
illegal was objectively unreasonable, Judge Carnes took into account the
fact that every circuit to consider grooming policies like Blockbuster’s
has declared them non-discriminatory.134 Because the plaintiffs chose to
protest a grooming policy despite long-standing precedent holding such
policy was not discriminatory; the plaintiffs could not have had an
objectively reasonable belief that the policy discriminated against them
on the basis of their sex.135 This holding, taken to its logical conclusions,
seems to come closer to requiring an employee to be correct regarding
the lawfulness of the complained of activity. Although the Eleventh
Circuit paid lip-service to the lesser “good faith reasonable belief”
standard, the court based it’s finding of unreasonableness on the fact that
a long-standing precedent holding such conduct was not discriminatory.136
In other words, the plaintiffs were incorrect about the lawfulness of the
conduct.
Similarly, in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,137 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the plaintiff
lacked a reasonable belief that a coworker’s single statement violated
Title VII.138 In Jordan, the plaintiff was an African American employee
who was terminated after he complained to management about hearing a
coworker state, “[t]hey should put those two black monkeys in a cage
with a bunch of black apes and let the apes f—k them.”139 The Fourth
Circuit held the comment, although racist, was not severe or pervasive
enough to violate Title VII.140 The court based its finding of
unreasonableness on the substantive law of racial harassment rather than
the subjective reasonableness of the employee, or even the fact that the
employer had a policy which obliged employees to report racially
discriminatory conduct to management.141

133

Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Little, 103 F.3d at 960).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1389.
136 Id. at 1388.
137 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).
138 Id. at 341.
139 Id. at 336.
140 Id. at 340.
141 Id. at 352−53 (King, J., dissenting); see generally Brake, supra note 40, at 121.
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V. NEW JERSEY’S RECENT INTERPRETATION OF THE LAD IN
BATTAGLIA
Despite the Supreme Court decisions broadening the basis for
retaliation claims, scholars and commentators continually criticize the
federal courts for failing to protect employee rights in the workplace,
giving rise to a call for state laws and courts to fill the gaps in protection
left by federal statutes and the judiciary.142 The LAD and the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Battaglia v. United Parcel Service,
Inc. may have filled one of the gaps.143
The Supreme Court of New Jersey effectively lowered the standard
for establishing a claim of retaliation under the LAD in Battaglia, which
held that as long as an employee can demonstrate a good-faith belief that
the conduct complained of violated the LAD or possibly that the conduct
was simply inconsistent with the objectives of the LAD, he or she is not
required to show actual discrimination against an identifiable victim.144
Michael Battaglia was an employee of defendant United Parcel Service,
Inc. (UPS), in a supervisory position, and a subordinate to defendant
Wayne DeCraine.145 In September 2005, Battaglia was demoted.146 He
alleged that the demotion was retaliation for complaints he made about
DeCraine’s conduct.147 According to the plaintiff, DeCraine made a
number of sexually inappropriate comments about female employees of
UPS.148 DeCraine made those remarks only in the presence of male
employees, and no comment was made to, or in front of, any female

142 See Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
187, 193 (2008) (stating that after a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of disability in a restrictive fashion, the focus of
disability rights advocates shifted to “trying to change the definition of disability in state
laws”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE J.L. 225, 225 (2008)
(noting the “recent movement to . . . increas[e] states' power to regulate the workplace”); see
generally Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing Deference: Learning Lessons from Recent
Congressional Rejection of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of Discrimination Statutes, 33
RUTGERS L. REC. 40 (2009) (arguing that “blind adherence to federal interpretations of
discrimination principles on state employment discrimination claims is not only often
inappropriate, but also has seriously impacted the development of employment discrimination
law”).
143 214 N.J. 518 (2013).
144 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West 2014); Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 547−51.
145 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 526–27.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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employee.149 The comments included using the word “c***” in reference
to several women; using the phrase “f***ing b****” in reference to one
particular woman; discussing pornographic websites; referencing an
administrative staff member’s “big tits;” expressing a desire to engage in
sexual activity with a female employee; and referencing an employee
named “Regina” as “Vagina.”150 Plaintiff alleged that he spoke with
DeCraine about the comments, met with the center’s supervisors who
heard the remarks concerning their inappropriateness, and wrote an
anonymous letter to UPS’s corporate Human Resources manager in
January 2005 alleging that, “the leaders of the district used langu[age]
you wouldn’t use with your wors[t] nightmare[.]”151
The plaintiff claimed that his demotion violated the LAD because it
was in retaliation for his complaints regarding DeCraine’s offensive
comments about female employees.152 The appellate court overturned a
jury verdict for the plaintiff on his LAD claim, holding that, absent an
impact on a female employee, the plaintiff’s complaints could not
constitute protected activity under the LAD and consequently, were not
protected.153 The appellate court relied mostly on statutory interpretation,
reasoning that the LAD prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an employee based on sex and prohibits reprisals against a person
who opposes practices forbidden under the statute.154 The court concluded
that without evidence of sex discrimination against women or a hostile
work environment, there could be no recovery for retaliation.155
In overturning the appellate courts holding concerning the LAD
claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized the “broad remedial
purposes” of the LAD.156 These purposes include not only protecting the
rights of individual employees, but also protecting the public’s strong
interest in a discrimination free workplace.157 The court noted, “the
149

Id. at 529.
Id.
151 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 526–27.
152 Id. at 518.
Plaintiff also alleged that his demotion violated the Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. STAT. ANN. Sections 34:19-1 to 34:19-14, as he was
retaliated against for complaining about improper employee conduct in the company; the
appellate division affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on his CEPA claim and the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed. Id.
153 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 529.
154 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a), (d) (West 2014).
155 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 546–49.
156 Id. (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 603–04 (1993)).
157 Id. (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600).
150
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language attributed to DeCraine is particularly vile, demeaning and
offensive, bespeaking attitudes and view [sic] about women that have no
place in a work setting.”158 In explaining why the broad remedial purposes
of the LAD would not be advanced if Battaglia was not protected, the
court emphasized that, “[t]hese were not the occasional words of a lowlevel employee having a bad day, but were the words of a supervisor,
uttered in meetings attended by managerial employees, both repeatedly
and routinely.”159
Battaglia’s allegations of offensive language
concerning protected classes under the LAD supported a retaliation cause
of action despite the fact that the language was not directed toward
women and did not create an actionable claim for either disparate impact
or hostile work environment.
The court was unclear as to whether it was articulating a new, lower
standard for the LAD retaliation claims, or simply articulating a natural
consequence of the good faith reasonable belief standard for complaints
of retaliation already ingrained in New Jersey case law. For example, the
court noted:
[W]hen an employee voices a complaint about behavior or activities
in the workplace that he or she thinks are discriminatory, we do not
demand that he or she accurately understand the nuances of the LAD
or that he or she be able to prove that there was an identifiable
discriminatory impact upon someone of the requisite protected class.160

If a reasonable good faith complaint is all that is required for an
employee to be protected from retaliation, it naturally follows that there
can be no requirement of an identifiable discriminatory impact. The court
has consistently looked at the attitude and mind of the complaining
employee, not at the acts of the employer.
VI. ANALYSIS
The New Jersey’s Supreme Court’s interpretation of the LAD and
application of the reasonable good faith standard appears to be in line
with the reasoning in most recent Supreme Court retaliation cases, apart
from Nassar and Breeden. The New Jersey Supreme Court overturned
the appellate decision, which relied on strict statutory interpretation, and
followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court by broadly
interpreting this remedial anti-retaliation statute based upon its “purpose”
158
159
160

Id. at 547–48.
Id.
Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 545–49.
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of eradicating discrimination in the workplace.161
The good faith reasonable belief standard, when correctly applied,
furthers the goal and purpose of anti-retaliation provisions, especially
when compared to the actual language of the statutes, which only protects
conduct opposing actual violations.162 If courts were to rely exclusively
on statutory language, and not on the good faith reasonable belief
standard, the loopholes in employee protection could allow a
discriminatory and retaliatory employer to escape liability due to what
seem to be technicalities in the law. In terms of interpreting retaliation
provisions particularly broadly, there is also a strong public policy
argument for courts to allow a retaliation claim to stand based on the good
faith reasonable belief of the plaintiff, rather than the actual existence of
discriminatory behaviors. If plaintiffs lost their jobs or faced some other
form of retaliation because they misinterpreted the law, they may be
dissuaded from reporting behavior they believe to be a violation of the
statute.
For example, if the Little court applied the Battaglia reasoning to the
facts of that case, Little’s good faith belief in the unlawfulness of the
racially derogatory statement made by his co-worker would have been
sufficient to support his claim for retaliation, regardless of whether or not
the statement violated substantive law. Therefore, Little would have been
protected against the retaliatory action of his employer.
There is a danger, however, in broadening statutory interpretation
too much and relying solely on judicial discretion in retaliation cases.
The possibility of frivolous claims brought by those who simply had their
feelings hurt in the office or those who legitimately lost their jobs based
on bad performance poses a real judicial economic threat. Arguably, the
protection against frivolous claims using the good faith reasonable belief
standard is the reasonableness requirement. However, the court in
Battaglia focused almost entirely on the good faith of the plaintiff’s
complaints, rather than on the reasonableness of his complaints. This
aspect of the opinion may open the door for frivolous claims and creates
161

Id. at 560–62.
But cf. Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Anti-retaliation Principle, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 375, 375 n. 437 (2010); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report:
The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities
Under Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1130–31 (2007) (arguing
that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision should protect employees who report on an employer
in subjective good faith, even if the employee is wrong or the employee's belief is
unreasonable).
162
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a problem of precedent for lower courts to rely on in interpreting the
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief.
General issues exist in the interpretation of the good faith reasonable
belief standard, as lower federal courts have applied the reasonable belief
standard in different ways.163 Some treat it like a requirement that an
employee report actual violations of the law, while others ignore the
reasonableness requirement altogether.164 One of the major reasons for
the adoption of the reasonable good faith standard is the fact that it is
unfair to require a layperson to know the nuances of anti-discrimination
statutes.165 According to the Eleventh Circuit in Harper, however, a
layperson should be required to know the precedent in the jurisdiction
before voicing his or her complaints in order to remain objectively
reasonable.166 Applying the standard and reasoning of Battaglia,
however, the plaintiff’s claims in Harper would have been better received
by the court, unless the employer could have shown bad faith or that their
belief in the unlawfulness of requiring male employees to be well
groomed was so unreasonable that it bordered upon bad faith.
Just as the application of the Supreme Court’s good faith reasonable
belief standard varies in lower courts, the actual impact of the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s holding in Battaglia is unclear. The decision could
simply be looking to the guidance of federal court decisions on Title VII
and applying a good faith reasonable standard, which is sensitive to the
fact that most lay people are unaware of the nuances of an expansive antidiscrimination statute such as the LAD. Although not explicitly, the
decision may also have eliminated the reasonable belief requirement
entirely, as it focuses almost exclusively on the good faith of Battaglia’s
belief. This interpretation would mean the New Jersey Supreme Court
has taken employee protection a step further than the United States
163 Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1385 (11th Cir. 1998); Little v.
United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 956 (11th Cir. 1997); Moberly, supra note 163, at 375 n. 438;
Rosenthal, supra note 163, at 1162–63 (“[M]any courts . . . do not seem to be taking into
account the ‘limited knowledge’ most Title VII plaintiffs have about the contours of Title VII,
and the courts have consistently ruled against employees after concluding that their belief of
a Title VII violation was not objectively reasonable.”).
164 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 526; Harper, 139 F.3d at 1385; Little, 103 F.3d at 956; Moberly,
supra note 163, at 375 n. 438; Rosenthal, supra note 159, at 1162–63 (“[M]any courts . . . do
not seem to be taking into account the ‘limited knowledge’ most Title VII plaintiffs have
about the contours of Title VII, and the courts have consistently ruled against employees after
concluding that their belief of a Title VII violation was not objectively reasonable.”).
165 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006).
166 Harper, 139 F.3d at 1385.
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Supreme Court—a step that may not apply under the federal antidiscrimination laws in light of the Supreme Court’s recent narrow
interpretation in Nasser.
There has been criticism from legal scholars who argue that the
reasonable belief doctrine is simply a “poor proxy for addressing
weaknesses in the plaintiff’s proof of causation.”167 If that were the case,
the removal of such a requirement would force courts to address the
causation issue transparently and straightforwardly, which may clear
confusion in its application.168 Further, a reasonableness standard without
further clarification allows courts to continue to measure the
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief based on the substantive underlying
law, which is contrary to the broad remedial purposes of antidiscrimination statutes.
Finally, and most radically, the Battaglia decision focuses so much
on the “purpose” and “values” of the statute, that it may in fact be used
by lower courts to support a claim of retaliation when plaintiffs oppose
any action that is contrary to the “spirit” of the LAD. This interpretation
would significantly broaden the scope of the statute and allow for a great
deal of judicial discretion in determining what actions offend the general
purpose of this expansive statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
The New Jersey Supreme Court must clarify the good faith
reasonable belief standard as it was articulated in Battaglia. Although
the standard has had some success in Title VII and other federal
retaliation cases, and allows for some needed discretion to eliminate
protection loopholes afforded by the statute alone, some interpretation
problems exist. Frivolous claims may pass muster under a test that pays
little attention to reasonableness or is based entirely on the “spirit” of a
statute. Furthermore, the lack of horizontal equity bound to occur when
lower courts are asked to implement a standard that arguably has three
rational interpretations and offers little guidance will prove to be an issue
in New Jersey courts.
Interpreting the LAD with sensitivity to the fact that lay people are
unaware of the nuances of the law, while still requiring that the plaintiff’s
belief be reasonable, would not only be in line with the plaintiff-friendly

167
168

See Brake, supra note 40, at 156.
Brake, supra note 40, at 156.
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purpose of the LAD, but would also allow courts to guard against
frivolous claims. Finally, a plaintiff-friendly reasonableness standard
would provide adequate guidance to lower courts, ensuring that courts do
not continue to require plaintiffs to be correct about the underlying
substantive law.

